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Why ASEAN Could Stay Strong?
Dinna Wisnu Paramadina University, Indonesia
Abstract
How confident are ASEAN as a regional organization? Will ASEAN turn into a mere coffee-
talk forum? This article evaluates the bases for ASEAN and demonstrates that ASEAN has
reasons to stay strong as regional cooperation. Rather than denying tensions, this article
agrees that there are tensions among members but it also recognizes such challenge as the one
that unites ASEAN members together. There are some dilemmas among members of ASEAN
that does not left much room for members but to cooperate with each other: the dilemma of
risking higher tensions among members, the dilemma of risking the benefits of existing
pooling of resources, the dilemma of improving connectivity among members and the
dilemma of facing global pressure on good governance and liberal democracy.
Keywords: ASEAN, regionalism, dilemma, commitment, diplomacy
Introduction
How sustainable is ASEAN (Association
of South East Asian Nations) as a regional
organization? The confidence in ASEAN
used to be high, but the recent case of
failure of ASEAN to issue a joint
communique at the 45th ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting in Phnom Penh had raised serious
doubts on the centrality of ASEAN in the
hearts of ASEAN members. At some levels,
it brought concern externally too on how
competent ASEAN is as an organization to
handle disagreements on sensitive issues.
No confidence means lesser confidence in
working coherently as a regional
cooperation, which means ASEAN could
become mere groups of coffee-talk between
members. Is ASEAN that close to jeopardy?
ASEAN may be like any other regional
groupings; created based on agreements on
members to uphold certain values and
maintained because of certain common
interests. Its dimensions of cooperation are
also similar, socio-cultural engagement,
economic cooperation, political and security
building measures. But these are not the
sole ties between ASEAN members.
This paper evaluates the bases for
ASEAN to stay strong as regional
cooperation. It argues that ASEAN is not
built and maintained based on consensus
and agreements alone but also on dilemmas
and common challenges. The current
developments in regional setting and global
power shift have significance too in how
members see and cooperate with each other.
Of course, there is always a potential for
severe unusual circumstance that would
challenge ASEAN unity, but current
unfolding of events do not suggest such
path. All would be discussed in light of
principles of diplomacy, current events and
historical ties between country members.
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Reasons for Common Agreements
No man is an island and so is a nation-
state. No nation-state can bear the reality of
being alone, isolated, let alone encircled by
external pressures that they have no
influence to mitigate. Regionalism is one
means to wither external pressures through
agreements, trust and intensive cooperation
among countries in certain territory.
Theoretically speaking, regionalism is a
grouping of countries that share either
common history, common values, or
common goals or combination of all of
these. The idea is to create common identity
(such as those aimed by European countries
through EU), enhance economic
cooperation, or other kinds of cooperation.
With that logic, the policies developed in
regionalism tend to favour protectionism in
favour of members’ (socioeconomic)
growth. However, in 1990s, there’s the-so-
called “new regionalism” where the idea is
to create “open regionalism”. The focus
becomes heavy on economic cooperation,
particularly trade. Countries seek trade
deals, have no problem (or are actually
happy about) welcoming more countries to
join the grouping. As Grugel (2004) said, the
new regionalism is a state-led project in the
context of global transformation, part of
state strategy to secure or holding onto
markets and investment in the face of global
transformation; and to adopt multilateral
approach in handling issues considered
important for the time.
In reality, ASEAN is different from the
typical regionalism. On the one hand
ASEAN indeed share common values and
goals, but parts of their history (including
among members and with outside
countries) are divergent. When ASEAN was
founded, the idea was less about
establishing common identity and more
about downsizing and preventing tensions
among members.
The case of regionalism in ASEAN,
particularly in the early years, should be
seen in light of a search for new identity as
countries used to be known as mere
colonies of Western countries, who had
successfully supported (and initiated) a
massive and influential movement of the
developing world to stand different from
the Western-Eastern divide during the Cold
War: the non-aligned movement. While
ASEAN and Non-Aligned Movement are
two separate things, there is the similar
desire between members in the two
groupings to assert firm position that are
different from stands asserted by “big”
powers. The two groupings enhanced each
other’s presence.
Established in Bangkok on 8 August
1967, ASEAN members began with just 5
countries: Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Thailand. Five foreign
ministers agreed to sign the ASEAN
Declaration: Foreign Minister Adam Malik
of Indonesia, Narciso Ramos of the
Philippines, Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia,
S. Rajaratnam of Singapore and Thanat
Khoman of Thailand. The five agreed to
build a tool and space to allow enhanced
cooperation in the economic, social,
cultural, technical, educational and other
fields in the promotion of regional peace
and stability through abiding respect for
justice, rule of law, and adherence of
principles of the United Nations. Everyone
agreed to bind countries in friendship, joint
efforts and sacrifices for the sake of peace,
freedom, prosperity in the region.
Touching upon the principle of “open
regionalism”, actually since the start,
ASEAN already stated its openness for
participation by all States in the Southeast
Asian regions which subscribe to its aims,
principles and purposes. Its goal was not to
be exclusive but to be open in creating
manageable relations in the region.
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What made the five ASEAN leaders
agreed on the terms of regional grouping is
most impressive, especially considering the
young-age of these countries, all (except
Thailand) are former colonies and all are
developing nations (with limited resources
and experiences in sustaining economic
growth). Instead of competing, they agree
to join hands. This was ground-breaking in
their own times.
Based on documents from ASEAN
Secretariat, there were several issues that
brought them together:
1. Repeated tensions between
Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia.
Thailand brokered the reconciliation
between these countries.
2. Awareness that each country are
pursuing own limited objectives and
dissipating its meagre resources in the
overlapping and often conflicting resources.
This was raised by Philippines’ Narciso
Ramos.
3. Desire as “a region to stand on its
own feet, strong enough to defend itself
against any negative influence from outside
region”. This was raised by Indonesia’s
Adam Malik. On similar count, Tun Abdul
Razak of Malaysia said that Southeast Asian
countries need decisive and collective action
to prevent the eruption of intra-regional
conflicts and manipulation against one
another. Rajaratnam of Singapore feared the
risk of “balkanization” affecting Southeast
Asia.
Unlike the case of European Union or
Mercosur in Latin America, ASEAN despite
its birth during the “old regionalism”
concept, it was not aimed at protectionism
per se, let alone narrowly-defined economic
cooperation. In fact, since its birth, ASEAN
already calls this an open grouping for any
countries in Southeast Asia to join. The idea
is to create strength that can withstand
political whirlwind in global relations,
while at the same time develop mechanism
to tap resources in this region in wise way.
While ASEAN members agreed to
defend themselves from external forces, it
was not a political or military alliance.
There was not even an idea of using this
grouping as a tool to joint military forces in
defending the region. In fact, despite the
desire to be an independent-minded region,
ASEAN doesn’t oppose military and
political alliance of some members with
external powers (e.g. Philippines and
Singapore with the US).
In terms political security cooperation,
the inclusion of countries in Greater
Mekong Sub-region (GMS) suggests that
ASEAN’s goal is indeed to be inclusive of
all countries in the region, despite different
ideologies. ASEAN saw the potentials and
wanted to take advantage of the GMS
cooperation, which had been established
with initiatives from the United Nations,
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and South
Vietnam. The cooperation opened ways for
countries in GMS, Laos, Thailand,
Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, to exploit
the waterways for energy, irrigation,
transportation and fisheries instead of
engaging in on-and-off wars like they used
to be (Mya Than & George Abonyi 2001). So
there is a foundation to belief that GMS
countries would evolve stronger when tied
together in a frame of cooperation.
Over time, we also see how ASEAN
built more tools for confidence building
measures among members and beyond. The
creation of ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace,
Freedom and Neutrality) on November 27,
1971 was aimed at declaring shared
responsibility for members to create social
stability in the region and to reject any
forms of external interference in any
manifestation in the region. The idea also
was to preserve local identities which
would bring closer cooperation and trust
among members. In Declaration of ASEAN
Concord in Bali 1974, such commitment is
strengthened with the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation (TAC) to respect ZOPFAN and
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if any inter-country problems happen in the
region, immediate actions would be taken
to settle dispute in most effective and
efficient means. In the treaty, members
agree that the use of force against each other
should never be done and everyone agree to
refrain from interference in other countries’
internal affairs. The tool chosen to manage
tension was cooperation.
Today TAC becomes the tool to reach
out to big powers and non-Southeast Asian
countries with stakes in Southeast Asia such
as the United States, European Union, India,
China, even Australia, Russia and New
Zealand. In the political security front, there
is ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) formed in
1994, a dialog forum to build confidence
among ASEAN members and partners and
to be utilized as preventive diplomacy in
the region. This forum is used as a tool to
reduce tensions and avert the possibility of
war by eliminating elements of secrecy in
military activity, discussing potential
adversary, and working together in
building norms and communication lines
that would enhance confidence with each
other. By being members of ARF, countries
agree to manage tension, avoid conflict, and
find peaceful resolution in cost-effective
ways. In ARF, ASEAN has 10 dialogue
partners (Australia, Canada, China, the EU,
India, Japan, New Zealand, ROK, Russia
and the United States), one ASEAN
observer (PNG) as well as the DPRK,
Mongolia, Pakistan, East Timor, Bangladesh
and Sri Lanka.
So, the strength of ASEAN as a regional
organization is supported by three major
commitments:
1. amity based on respect and principle
of non-intervention,
2. confidence to each other that most
effective and efficient ways to settle tension
and dispute would be chosen, and
3. ASEAN as instrument to strengthen
cooperation for member countries and with
those beyond.
These factors alone are unique, where
ASEAN is never intended to be exclusive
but rather as a key instrument agreed by all
members and any countries “passing” this
region to settle potential differences. The
vision of ASEAN has been built for further
futures.
The tricky part here is the commitment
that is exclusive for the member, isn’t it?
What is cooperation if the members cannot
feel any exclusive benefits for being
members? On the one hand ASEAN has
provided prestige in international relations,
which is crucial for diplomacy by
developing countries but the “openness” of
ASEAN as a regional cooperation allows the
challenges for ASEAN centrality to grow.
The Fourth Major Commitment
Any organizations, especially those that
have chosen to legalize its status as binding
organizations with standard-operating-
procedures applied to members, need to
keep evolving based on the needs and
wants of members. By choosing to be an
organization that is based on compliance,
ASEAN must be present to cater to the
needs of members and, to some extent, just
to members. The plus-plus partners may
enjoy some benefits, but theirs should be a
second or third priority. In other words,
when ASEAN codified its norms, rules and
values and established the ASEAN Charter
on December 15, 2008, there is a
responsibility (and automatic expectation
from members) to set clear (tangible) results
for ASEAN members and then hold
accountability to their achievements over
time.
How to reconcile this fourth major
commitment with the previous three?
All must return to the members of
ASEAN. The Secretariat of ASEAN, which
is agreed to be the focal points of actions,
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coordination and direction for members,
can only be strong when empowered by
initiatives, people and financial support
from members. Unlike a corporation whose
board of executives can be recruited apart
from the pool of internal people, ASEAN
board of executives must be selected from
ASEAN bests.
But I am not going to dissect the
management issues within ASEAN here.
After all, as much as it is a legal institution,
ASEAN was and still is a political
organization. It exists and remains strong
for political reasons and because of political
commitments from the higher authorities in
each country members. Here, the nature of
conflicts today becomes an important
variable to take into account in the strength
of ASEAN.
Robert Kaplan (2011) wrote in
Foreign Policy, that the future of world
conflict is in the sea in Asia. He made notes
on the high potential for world-class conflict
emanating from the South China Sea
conflict. Paul Wolfowitz, former US
Ambassador to Indonesia who was also the
second-senior person from Pentagon, said
in 2009 that if only ASEAN as a regional
organization is absent, conflicts between
Asian countries might escalate to an
unprecedented level.
In parts, although very implicitly,
Robert Kaplan had sensed the unsettled
issues among members in ASEAN, which is
territorial borders. On the seas, there are no
agreements yet (that is not even pending)
on borders between Indonesia-Philippines,
Malaysia let alone with non-members such
as Indonesia-Timor Leste, Indonesia-
Australia, Philippines-China, Malaysia-
China and so-on. On land, there is still
pending homework on border agreements
or monitoring between Thailand-Cambodia,
Indonesia-Malaysia,
Logically, if non-intervention is
among the major commitments of ASEAN,
then the unsettled border agreements could
jeopardize relations. Yetwe should
remember that ASEAN came together
because of bad relations between them in
the first place. Would they render to
destructive measures facing challenges in
their border front? It would jeopardize their
efforts for decades, wouldn’t it? This is the
first dilemma that would keep ASEAN
members in amity with each other despite
tensions. There are problems but
highlighting the problem for the sake of
raising the issues would trigger more
problems.
Secondly, the world has changed.
Theories have suggested that the practice of
international relations in the 21st century
have changed much compared to the
previous century. The complexity have
grown much due to the growing numbers
and types of actors involved, i.e. state and
non-state actors (from business mogul to
media professionals, criminals and Non-
Governmental Organizations). The number
of diplomatic activities have more than
tripled in the past decade (Leguey-Feilleux,
2011); requiring heads of states, ministers
and diplomats to travel extensively and
frequently around the world to “make a
difference” in their missions. While
conventional power of military weapons
and nuclear still creates jitters in the
relationships among countries, the socio-
economic interdependence among nations
have induced countries to be more cautious
in building relationship with other
countries.
As noted by Temsak Chalermpalanupap
(2009), there were no summits held during
ASEAN’s first decade. But in the wake of
ASEAN’s inaugural summit in 1976,
meetings among the top leaders of the
members grew more frequent and more
formal. By 2007 there are summits of
ASEAN Plus One (with Japan, South Korea
and India); ASEAN Plus Three (with China,
Japan, and South Korea) and since 2005 the
East Asia Summit (EAS) comprising
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ASEAN, Australia, China, India, Japan,
New Zealand and South Korea. There are
also more ministerial sectors involved in
ASEAN meetings including economics,
finance, culture, society and environment.
There are also other meeting formats
including Senior Official Meetings (SOM),
committees, subcommittees and task forces.
In other words, there is the
component of “pooling of resources” that
members have invested through dozens
summits and thousands of coordinative
meetings. When ASEAN enlarged its
membership to 10 nation-states, the
numbers of meetings proliferated even
more. Would members risk those
investments by hardening positions against
each other? It is most likely not. This is the
second dilemma that would keep ASEAN
members in amity with each other despite
tensions.
Tough talk between policymakers is
by no means the dominant tone of
conversation between countries, even if
they are so eager to resort to it. It is not the
tone that would make things workable. In
the 21st century engagement of countries,
there is no such thing as non-negotiable
values. Core values are neither absolute nor
rigid. The interdependence between nation-
states has rendered rigidity impossible in
managing difficult situations. Hence we
need to explore the interpretations and
transformation of those values for countries
under consideration (Joseph Fraenkel 1979,
p.93). Fraenkel once mentioned that the
common denominator of all countries’
traditional basic core values is self-
preservation, which is flexibly defined, not
only in political and socio-economic
structure but also in ideological and cultural
aspects. With increasing levels of
comprehensive partnerships, regionalism
and multilateralism, this way of looking at
the defense of other countries would be
more useful than comparing claims of
sovereignty.
The increasing mobility of people,
money, investment, and information across
borders had rendered rigid core-values of
people, state and government obsolete.
While ASEAN citizens have yet to all feel
and speak on behalf of ASEAN, the identity
of ASEAN is an important part of discourse
across ASEAN countries. Most people in
ASEAN may not know everything about
ASEAN but they won’t discard ASEAN
either. There is something emotional about
ASEAN among members, which is mostly
about having friends to collaborate with in
the uncertainty of world affairs. Among
diplomats in ASEAN, the emotion is even
greater, which is anchored on the hope for
having a big single community that is
economically advanced and politically
respected around the world. Such hope is
what keeps the “investments” among
members going through ASEAN activities.
So, when it comes to creating
exclusive benefits for ASEAN members, the
existing opportunity for that is the array of
partnerships with the ASEAN Plus
members and beyond. The politicians and
diplomats in ASEAN are the ones mostly at
work for garnering such partnerships. At
least at the current stage, they are the
busiest one. They build links, networks and
dialogs which foster connections between
governments, business entities and in very
few instances also academic/research
institutions.
An important project for ASEAN
members is the ASEAN Connectivity
project. The idea of this project was first
proposed by Thai Prime Minister Abhisit
Vejjajiva at the Opening Ceremony of the
42nd ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on
July 20, 2009 in Phuket, Thailand. He
proposed that “community connectivity”
should be one objectives of the ASEAN
Community 2015, meaning that goods,
people, investments and initiatives should
travel obstacle-free throughout the region.
ASEAN’s software and hardware should be
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connected. The initiative was endorsed and
a Master Plan was created. On October 28,
2010, ASEAN adopted the Hanoi
Declaration of the Adoption of the Master
Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, giving task to
ministers, ASEAN Connectivity
Coordinating Committee and the National
Coordinators supported by the ASEAN
Secretariat to oversee the implementation of
the plan and report back to ASEAN
Leaders.
A study by the Center of Policy Analysis
and Development for Asia-Pacific and
African Region at the Indonesia’s Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (2011) concludes that the
ASEAN Connectivity project is central to
promote growth and cross-border
socioeconomic interaction among ASEAN
members. If all country members share a
strategic vision with strong commitment for
all, then the limitations of current
infrastructure facilities could be improved
significantly. To date, there is still big
homework not only in land connectivity but
also in maritime connectivity. If the ASEAN
Connectivity project works well, all parts of
the countries in ASEAN would not only
enjoy business and social connectivity but
also get the power generation they need for
industrialization in the remote areas.
The ASEAN Connectivity project is
among those that ASEAN as a legal
organization should take accountability on
and where members could feel the exclusive
and direct benefits for being ASEAN
members. Such project shows us the third
dilemma in ASEAN that then ties members
together, i.e. that they can only grow
stronger as economic powers if they join
hands in building connectivity. On the one
hand, the connectivity project is very costly
financially. The socioeconomic gaps
between members of ASEAN are
significant; some members are not happy if
they have to minimize the gap through aids
to the less-wealthy member countries. In the
face of foreign investments and cooperation,
there are occasions where some member
countries prefer to stand on its own identity
rather than as ASEAN members.  On the
other hand, the bigger goodness of
developments coming from partnership of
ASEAN Plus can only be felt through
ASEAN membership. Projects as big as the
ASEAN Connectivity attract series of
foreign investments.
Indeed, the fourth major commitment of
ASEAN, which is to bind members in
agreements and concert of actions have
generated more energy and hope to the
world. It gives hope to non-ASEAN
members that ASEAN after all could be a
reliable organization that can make
decisions and act on behalf of members. It
gives a new meaning to the “ASEAN way”
where Acharya (2001) mentioned that
members are tied by norms. With the
ASEAN Charter commitment, members
have the responsibility to speak as one
through one policy.
Is it too tough for ASEAN? Let us
scrutinize this fourth major commitment of
ASEAN. David Martin Jones (2008) argued
that the ASEAN Charter promotes two
incompatible norms: one that maintains the
traditional formula of non-interference in
internal affairs as the basis of regional
peace, and one that promotes democracy
and fundamental freedoms. He noted that
the Charter calls, though somewhat
ambiguously, for regional transformation,
namely a transformation in the “legal and
institutional framework” for the
“promotion and protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms”. Hence
implicitly the Charter calls for active
strengthening of democratic values, good
governance and rejection of
unconstitutional and undemocratic change
of government.
It would rather be more cautious in
concluding that ASEAN is promoting two
incompatible norms. I’d say instead that
this is a reflection of the fourth dilemma that
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binds member countries in ASEAN
together, namely in responding to global
pressure for good governance and liberal
model of government accountability. Not all
country members in ASEAN agree with the
commitment implied in ASEAN Charter,
but there is not much choice. The risk for
standing alone on this issue is far greater.
Hence, the ASEAN’s goal of promoting
human rights and protecting freedoms
should be seen from the perspective of
political adjustment to the changing nature
of diplomacy today.
In the past, diplomacy did not go much
further than bridging communication and
cooperation between nations. At most
diplomats may be assigned for counter-
intelligence activities, but changing
domestic politics remained the domain of
politicians rather than diplomats. Today,
diplomacy bears the responsibility to
promote similar values to partner countries,
and diplomats must be sensitive to the
domestic political developments of
partners. Consequently, it is quite common
today to observe missions for bringing like-
minded-countries together and closer to
each other. And the mission is clearer,
which is to endorse leaders and countries
that support peaceful elections as
mechanism for transfer of power. Why?
Partly because democratic countries are
believed to garner more peace and
distribute more to people (Ratnitzky, 2003)
and partly because democratic governance
is believed to be the triumphant and final
form of human government (Fukuyama,
1992).
Imagine if each country member in
ASEAN must bear such international
pressure alone. The governments in
Singapore, Malaysia and Myanmar, for
instance, would easily be condemned for
their lack of support in democratic
practices. Standing alone as individual
countries, they would be prone to external
intervention for “more democratic change”
in their governance. Together as ASEAN
members, however, they’d be buffered by
the “ASEAN Way” of transition; smoother
and more suitable in pace of change.Or if
one wants to speak more bluntly, ASEAN
would provide the blanket security (and
guarantee too) foranyone cooperating with
ASEAN members that peace and the values
democracy and freedom are understood in
Southeast Asia.
Diplomacy as ASEAN’s Lifeline
As we can see, ASEAN is unique in that
it has been sustained by tensions and
dilemmas across stakeholders and time. If
in other forms of regionalism there is a
strong secretariat that operates based on
centralization of power pooled from the
authorities of country members, in ASEAN
the practice has been different.
Zhongqi Pan (2008) grouped ASEAN
regionalism together with East Asian
regionalism which is open, inclusive, and
soft (because it was driven by smaller
nations and followed by great powers)
compared to the European Union model
that is closed, exclusive and hard (because it
was driven by great powers and followed
by smaller nations). Implicit in his analysis
is the doubt that ASEAN regionalism is
defined by the members, and not by the
great powers engaged in its frameworks of
cooperation. He described the non-uniform
approach toward each other, e.g. China and
Japan chose different paths in its relations to
the United States. Consequently, it brings
implications in the relations of ASEAN with
the United States.
On similar note, Peter Katzenstein(1996)
gave recognition to the unique regionalism
in Asia. He argued that regionalism in this
region is created on the basis of Asian
identity, which is the result of interaction
between real and imagined factors. It was a
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product of globalization and the growing
links of economic activities.
Katzenstein, however failed to recognize
the socio-political and security reasons
behind Asia’s, particularly ASEAN’s,
regionalism. ASEAN as regional
cooperation and institution is more than just
an economic instrument for deeper
cooperation among members.
The case of ASEAN demonstrates that
regionalism may go beyond promoting
similar interest and values. Instead,
regionalism can also be a product of
awareness of stark differences, challenges,
and dilemmas surrounding the relationship
among members and beyond. The case of
tensions and disagreements among
members and beyond, such as that found in
South China Sea, therefore should not be
seen as a challenge that weakens ASEAN.
On the contrary, it gives more reasons for
members to stick together.
Of course, one must understand that as
a political institution, ASEAN is messy in
decision making process. There are times
when disagreements occur and no joint-
statement can be made. And there is
nothing wrong about it. Each party of
dialog in ASEAN learns to speak their mind
and fight for what they believe. After all
this is an organization of the less-like-
minded nations. But at the end of the day, it
is much more sensible to keep working
together as members of ASEAN than to
stand alone in the harsh international
politics.
The key here is diplomacy among
members. The intensive talks and break-
down of activities is the lifeline of ASEAN.
At some points, members must see the
exclusive benefits for being ASEAN
members. The pride for being ASEAN must
be disseminated as broad as possible among
citizens of ASEAN. At the end of the day
this would help ASEAN more alive.
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